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Abstract 
This study examines the economic implications of fair value liability gains and losses arising 
from the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 159 (hereafter, FAS 159). 
Consistent with the notion that gains and losses contain value-relevant information, we find a 
positive correspondence between a firm’s FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses and 
current period stock returns. However, further analysis indicates that fair value gains and losses 
from liabilities have a negative association with future returns, suggesting that investors misprice 
this earnings component. This negative association is stronger for firms with low levels of 
institutional ownership. While the value-relevance tests provide some evidence that fair value 
changes from liabilities have information content, the negative association with future stock 
returns suggests that these gains are eventually not realizable or that the market has overreacted 
to the initial recognition of these gains. Overall, our study contributes evidence regarding the 
controversy over the recognition of fair value liability gains and losses by providing direct 
empirical evidence that such gains and losses are priced by the stock market but subsequently 
reversed within the next 12 months.  
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1. Introduction 
We examine how investors perceive the valuation implications of recognized fair value 
gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial 
Liabilities (hereafter, FAS 159; FASB 2007), allows firms to elect fair value as the measurement 
basis for certain financial instruments. A primary motivation for this standard is to allow a 
consistent measurement basis of both financial assets and financial liabilities on the balance 
sheet. This accounting standard also enables firms to apply fair value measurement on its 
financial liabilities for the first time.  
Because FAS 159 gives firms the option to fair value their financial liabilities, the 
standard has been controversial and has drawn considerable attention. Particularly, the inclusion 
of the effects of changes in a firm’s own credit risk when measuring the fair value of liabilities 
remains one of the most debated aspects of fair value accounting. Critics of this standard argue 
that reporting an accounting gain from its financial liabilities when the firm’s creditworthiness 
has deteriorated is very confusing to the market (Lipe 2002), and it is possible that managers can 
exploit the accounting treatment of fair valuing liabilities for opportunistic reasons (e.g., Guthrie 
et al. 2011; Henry 2009). There are also concerns that the fair value measurement of financial 
liabilities is unreliable, especially if these financial liabilities are not actively traded.  
Given the tremendous controversy over this rule, the FASB began deliberating on 
whether to update this rule several years ago. In January 2016, the FASB issued an Accounting 
Standards Update (ASU No. 2016-01), which specifies the requirement for firms to recognize in 
other comprehensive income (rather than net income) the portion of the total change in the fair 
value of a liability resulting from a change in the instrument-specific credit risk when the firm 
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has elected to measure the liability at fair value in accordance with the fair value option for 
financial instruments. The accumulated gains and losses due to these changes will still be 
reclassified from accumulated other comprehensive income to earnings if the financial liability is 
settled before maturity.1 Thus, within a decade since the inception of FAS 159, the FASB 
effectively reversed the requirement for fair value gains and losses from liabilities attributable to 
its own credit risk to be included as net income on the income statement.  
The revision to this rule met with strong approval from the banking industry (e.g., Eavis, 
2016; McLannahan 2016; Whitehouse 2012). While it appears that the financial industry initially 
lobbied for this rule in the first place, the banks ended up opposing it on grounds that the 
counterintuitive nature of this rule made it harder for them to explain their performance to 
investors and analysts.2 The rule created confusion in banks’ financial reporting because it 
distracted the banks from simply reporting the fundamental performance of their businesses. In 
addition, as the valuation implications of such fair value gains and losses seem questionable, 
analysts and investors are interested to know earnings that exclude the impact of these fair value 
gains and losses.  
Prior behavioral research that has examined this issue also suggests that participants do 
not perceive these gains and losses from liabilities in a similar manner as gains and losses from 
assets. Utilizing an experiment with CPAs as participants, Gaynor et al. (2011) find that the 
majority of the participants incorrectly assess a company’s credit risk as improving (deteriorating) 
when a fair value liability gain (loss) is recognized. Their study provides evidence that suggests 
financial statement users are likely to misinterpret fair value gains as positive signals and fair 
                                                 
1 The implementation date of this update starts for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2017. 
2 For example, Goldman Sachs reported US$ 845 million of income before extraordinary items in the third quarter 
of 2008, but gains from the fair value change in liabilities were US$ 3.8 billion. Without these gains, Goldman 
Sachs would have reported a loss of US$ 3 billion. Similarly, JPMorgan reported a US$ 54 million loss in the same 
quarter, but it would have reported a US$ 13.1 billion loss without the gains from the fair value change in liabilities.  
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value losses as negative signals, which is consistent with the income statement effects being 
counterintuitive. Another behavioral study shows that investors’ fair value judgments are 
contingent on whether the financial instrument in question is an asset or a liability, whether fair 
values produce gains or losses, and whether or not the item will be sold (Koonce et al. 2011). In 
particular, the authors find that investors consider fair value changes as more relevant for assets 
than for liabilities, even when the underlying economics of both types of financial instruments 
are held constant. 
The above findings suggest that market participants, including professional investors and 
analysts, perceive the valuation implications of fair value gains and losses from liabilities 
differently. On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence that shows the market is able to 
impute the gains and losses from the changes in fair value of liabilities to equity. Specifically, 
Barth et al. (2008) find that increases (decreases) in equity value are associated with decreases 
(increases) in debt value arising from increases (decreases) in credit risk, after controlling for the 
direct effect on equity value of the credit risk change. Thus, this study suggests that the stock 
market imputes the valuation implications of fair value changes in liabilities in the correct 
direction, just as it does fair value changes in assets.  
Our study attempts to provide direct evidence on whether there is a positive 
correspondence between stock returns and fair value gains and losses from liabilities, as Barth et 
al. (2008) have suggested. In particular, we examine whether reported fair value liability gains 
and losses provide value-relevant information. This evidence is especially relevant given the 
many assertions that the accounting for fair valuing liabilities is flawed. We also examine to 
what extent the valuation implications of these fair value changes affect future returns. We 
consider these research questions to be of importance given the controversy that raises troubling 
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questions about the nature of fair value gains and losses from liabilities, and what they really 
represent in the overall context of a firm’s fundamentals.  
Our sample firms are drawn from firms that elected the fair value option as the 
measurement basis for certain financial instruments, following FAS 159. We reviewed their 
financial statements from 2009 to 2012 to hand-collect financial statement information 
pertaining to FAS 159 disclosures. We find a positive association between a firm’s stock returns 
and FAS 159 fair value gains or losses from liabilities that is incremental to the market response 
to the firm’s earnings before inclusion of these fair value gains or losses. These results extend 
prior research that investigates the value relevance of fair value gains and losses of financial 
assets (e.g., Barth 1994). Consistent with the predictions of Barth et al. (2008), our study 
provides direct evidence that there is a decrease in equity value arising from a decrease in asset 
value, and an increase in equity value associated with a decrease in debt value. Contrary to the 
assertions that fair value gains and losses from liabilities are not value relevant, our empirical 
findings suggest that fair value gains and losses from debt value changes represent a component 
of a firm’s economic income that is priced by the market. 
In additional tests, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach to document that the 
value relevance of earnings for our sample firms improved, in terms of an increase in 
incremental adjusted R2, in the post-FAS 159 adoption period. We also assess the value 
relevance of gains from liabilities that are due to changes in a firm’s own credit risk and gains 
from liabilities that are due to changes in overall market conditions as reflected in market interest 
rates. The recognition of an accounting gain associated with the deterioration of a firm’s own 
credit risk is one reason why FAS 159 is controversial. The adoption of FAS 159 by certain firms 
enables us to directly examine those liability gains and losses that are attributable to changes in 
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their own credit risk for the first time. We are able to do so because these disclosures clearly 
distinguish the liability gains and losses arising from a firm’s own credit risk changes from 
liability gains and losses that are due to changes in other factors. We still find that gains and 
losses attributable to changes in a firm’s own credit risk are positively related to stock returns.   
Next, we examine the future valuation implications of these liability gains and losses by 
investigating the association between the earnings component and future returns. Because firms 
that report fair value liability gains (losses) are essentially bad (good) news firms (i.e., they 
report a gain (loss) because their credit worthiness has deteriorated (improved)), we examine 
whether there is a correspondence between these fair value gains and losses and future returns. A 
positive association will suggest that investors underestimate the valuation implications of fair 
value liability gains and losses, and that they were too pessimistic (optimistic) about the gains 
(losses) of these firms when those gains (losses) were initially reported. On the other hand, a 
negative association between fair value changes and future stock returns will suggest that 
investors are initially optimistic (pessimistic) about these gains (losses), but there are subsequent 
price reversals from these firms over the next 12 months.  
We find that liability gains have a significant, negative association with future one-year 
returns, indicating that investors were too optimistic with respect to these fair value changes. In a 
cross-sectional analysis, we find that this overreaction occurs mostly in the firms with low 
institutional ownership. An interpretation of these results is that investors are optimistic 
regarding the firm’s prospects when the firm reports net income that is boosted by fair value 
gains from liabilities but do not consider the real implications of these fair value gains and losses 
in the overall context of the firm’s changing fundamentals to market conditions. This finding 
provides some evidence that the fair value accounting for liabilities may be flawed, as most of 
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these gains are not realizable but instead are reversed from the financial statements in subsequent 
periods. In this regard, our results support the concerns expressed by many regarding the 
accounting treatment of fair valuing liabilities. We also note that when we disentangle liability 
gains from liability losses in our tests, the mispricing occurs only for the gain component of the 
fair value changes. We do not observe such mispricing occurring in the loss component. 
We contribute to extant research that addresses the controversy surrounding fair value 
accounting for liabilities. Barth et al. (2008) find that the relation between credit risk changes 
and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt. However, we note that 
since firms did not recognize gains from liabilities as earnings during their sample period, they 
were unable to conduct a direct test of the value relevance of fair value gains and losses from 
liabilities. In contrast, by using data on firms that recognize gains and losses from liabilities in 
the post-FAS 159 period, we are able to provide direct evidence on the value relevance of 
reported fair value gains and losses from liabilities. Furthermore, we find evidence that suggests 
fair value changes in liabilities have different future valuation implications compared with fair 
value changes in assets, which is not tested in Barth et al. (2008). Specifically, it appears that 
market participants might have misinterpreted the valuation implications of this earnings 
component, thus resulting in a market correction in subsequent periods among firms that report 
fair value liability gains.  We believe our paper is of interest to standard setters, regulators, and 
investors who are concerned about the financial reporting implications of fair valuing liabilities.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and research design. Section 4 discusses the main results and the 
results of additional analyses. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
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2. Hypothesis development  
2.1. Institutional background 
FAS 159 was promulgated to permit firms the option (i.e., the “fair value option”) to 
measure financial instruments at fair value on an instrument-by-instrument application. Under 
this standard, firms have the discretion to irrevocably elect fair value as the initial and 
subsequent measurement attribute for certain financial assets and liabilities. All fair value 
changes must be reflected in earnings, including fair value changes resulting from changes in 
market interest rates (and other macroeconomic factors) as well as changes in the firm’s own 
creditworthiness. To improve transparency, the standard requires various disclosures, including 
information relating to how changes in fair value affect a firm’s earnings. 
The stated objective of FAS 159 is to improve financial reporting by providing firms the 
opportunity to mitigate artificial volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related 
assets and liabilities differently. Adopting this standard will also allow firms to apply the fair 
value measurement basis to designated derivative assets and liabilities without having to apply 
complex hedge accounting provisions. Finally, standard setters believe that this standard will 
expand the use of fair value measurement and help to mitigate some of the limitations of the 
mixed-attribute reporting model. 
Because FAS 159 permits firms to fair value some of their liabilities, it has received 
considerable attention and resulted in much controversy over whether or not fair value gains 
from liabilities reflect economic income. In the following subsections, we highlight the main 
arguments in the debate for and against the fair value measurement of liabilities.3 
 
                                                 
3 See also the discussion paper by the IASB (2009) titled “Credit Risk in Liability Measurement” for an in-depth 
discussion of the issues pertaining to this debate. AAA FASC (2000, 2007) have also provided their views on this 
issue. 
 8 
2.1.1. Arguments for recognizing fair value gains and losses from liabilities as income 
i. Better match between assets and liabilities. A central argument for fair valuing a firm’s 
liabilities is to better align the measurement basis of a firm’s liabilities with the measurement 
basis of its corresponding assets. Measuring liabilities at fair value will lead to a consistent 
measurement basis on both sides of the balance sheet if a firm has been measuring its assets at 
fair value. In contrast, if a firm’s assets are measured at fair value but its liabilities are measured 
at amortized cost, changes in market interest rates or the firm’s credit risk will affect only the fair 
value measurements of the firm’s assets but will not lead to a remeasurement of its liabilities. If 
the measurement of liabilities does not incorporate the effect of these changes, there is an 
accounting income mismatch. Consequently, net income (or other comprehensive income) will 
be distorted by the mismatch, and will not properly reflect the underlying economics of the firm. 
This argument also underlies the FASB’s long-term objective of measuring liabilities at fair 
value to be consistent with measuring assets at fair value.  
Hodder et al. (2006) provide some evidence that supports this argument. They examine 
properties of GAAP net income, GAAP comprehensive income, and full fair value income to 
determine which accounting income measure best reflects firm risk. They find that investors 
view the volatility of full fair value income as a better measure of firm risk than the other two 
measures. The authors interpret their results as suggesting that greater inclusion of fair value 
estimates will lead to reported accounting income that better reflects a firm’s underlying 
economic risk. In a related study, Hirst et al. (2004) also document that a full fair value income 
measurement is more likely to enable analysts to reach better-informed value and risk judgments 
about a firm’s fundamentals. 
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ii. Wealth transfer between equity and debt holders. Barth et al. (2008) outline the economic 
justification for fair value measurement of a firm’s liabilities as a wealth transfer between equity 
and debt holders based on Merton’s (1974) theoretical framework.4 Briefly, equity holders have 
an option to put their firm to debt holders. That is, if the asset value of the firm falls below the 
value of debt, the shareholders can transfer the firm to the debt holders. When the value of the 
firm’s assets decreases, the value of exercising the put option increases. Thus the value of debt 
decreases to reflect the transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders due to the increase 
in the put option value.  
The above argument can also be viewed based on the classic accounting equation that 
assets equal liabilities plus equity, in which liabilities and equity represent two classes of claims 
against the firm’s assets. An increase in the credit risk of the firm’s liabilities represents a 
transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders in the following way. As the firm’s ability 
to pay its liabilities diminishes, the potential loss to shareholders is limited to the amount of their 
investment. In contrast, debt holders may be unable to recover the principal amount they lent to 
the firm because equity holders are not obligated to inject additional capital into the firm. 
Effectively, debt holders will “share” in the losses of the firm if the firm becomes insolvent. 
Therefore, the apparent gain to the firm is essentially an allocation of claims between the firm’s 
owners and its lenders. Hence, Barth and Landsman (1995) state that the “fair value accounting 
for liabilities is conceptually no different than for assets (p. 104)” since the decrease in liabilities' 
fair values arising from a deterioration of a firm's financial condition represents the transfer of 
wealth from creditors to equity holders. 
Supporting the above argument, Barth et al. (2008) find evidence that there are two 
countervailing equity value effects associated with increases in credit risk. The primary effect is 
                                                 
4 See also Bohn (2000) for a description of other theoretical models on risky debt valuation. 
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a decrease in equity value arising from a decrease in asset value, and the secondary effect is an 
increase in equity value associated with a decrease in debt value. Barth et al. (2008) document 
that the relation between credit risk change and equity returns is significantly less negative when 
the firm has more debt. Their finding is consistent with the reasoning that debt holders subsidize 
equity holders’ wealth decreases. Hence their study indicates that debt value changes resulting 
from the firms’ credit risk changes represent a component of a firm’s economic income and 
should be considered for inclusion in a firm’s accounting income. 
 
2.1.2. Arguments against recognizing fair value gains and losses from liabilities as income 
i. Realizability issue. While Merton’s theory is theoretically sound in its reasoning, it may not 
incorporate some of the effects of market realities. In particular, opponents of fair valuing 
liabilities argue that accounting measurement of liabilities does not take into account factors such 
as low tradability and counterparty constraints that make realization of fair value changes in 
liabilities unlikely. Hence any reported profit accruing to the firm from fair valuing its liabilities 
is essentially theoretical.5  
The realizability argument against fair valuing liabilities is as follows. If liabilities are 
seldom transferred, it is not clear whether the firm has the ability to benefit from the change in 
liability value, even if there is a change in its fair value. A liability transfer usually requires 
negotiations between the firm (i.e., the debt issuer) and its counterparties (i.e., the debt holders), 
which often is a lengthy process. Hence, most liabilities are typically held to maturity for 
redemption at their face value by the firm and typically do not involve debt renegotiation despite 
changes in the market value of a firm’s debt. Consequently, the economic impact to a firm’s 
                                                 
5 An alternative view is that realizability is irrelevant to this issue. Proponents argue that unrealized fair value gains 
and losses relate to forgone opportunities arising from the decision to continue to hold assets or owe liabilities. 
These forgone opportunities (or opportunity costs) are viewed as informative and allow investors to reassess the 
value of the firm.  
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equity holders attributable to changes in the fair values of a firm’s liabilities is unclear.6  In 
support of the above argument, Koonce et al. (2011) find that investors’ fair value judgments are 
contingent on specific contexts even if these judgments appear inconsistent with the predictions 
of economic theory. Specifically, they find that investors consider fair value changes to be less 
relevant for liabilities. Investors also view fair value changes as more relevant when firms 
anticipate selling or settling their financial instruments in the near term compared with held-to-
maturity financial instruments. 
ii. Counterintuitive nature of fair value gains and losses from liabilities. Critics argue that 
recognizing fair value changes in liabilities, particularly recognizing changes in debt value 
arising from changes in a firm’s own credit risk, will lead to counterintuitive results. The 
counterintuitive income statement effect argument remains one of the most commonly cited 
objections to fair valuing liabilities. When liability measurement includes the impact of a firm’s 
own credit risk, a firm reports an accounting gain from a decline in the credit quality of its 
liabilities. Opponents of fair value accounting for liabilities argue that this gain is misleading and 
counterintuitive. Their basic premise is that reporting accounting gains when a firm’s 
fundamentals deteriorate provides misleading information signals. For example, Lipe (2002) 
documents that accounting information conveys misleading positive signals when a firm that is 
approaching bankruptcy uses fair value to measure liabilities, because it reports a gain when its 
financial strength deteriorates and a loss when its financial strength increases.  
In a related study, Gaynor et al. (2011) also find that a majority of their survey 
respondents (i.e., over 70%) misinterpreted fair value gains attributable to a deterioration in a 
firm’s creditworthiness as a positive signal and fair value losses as a negative signal. Using 
                                                 
6 In contrast, unrealized fair value changes in assets can be recognized or disclosed in the financial statements 
because these assets are presumed to be readily available for disposal unless there are significant restrictions 
preventing the firm from disposing them.  
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CPAs as survey respondents, many of these financial statement experts incorrectly assess a 
company’s credit risk as improving (deteriorating) when a fair value gain (loss) is recognized. 
Their study provides evidence in support of the claim that market participants might not be able 
to unravel the counterintuitive income statement effect arising from changes in liability fair 
values due to changes in a firm’s own creditworthiness. Taken together, these studies suggest 
that the counterintuitive nature of fair value liability gains and losses could cause financial 
statement readers to misinterpret the valuation signals arising from reported income figures, and 
the effect extends to qualified accounting professionals such as CPAs as well. 
2.2. Hypotheses 
We address the above issues by empirically examining the valuation implications of fair 
value gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities for firms that adopt FAS 
159. Our setting allows for a direct test of the above arguments about whether fair valuing 
liabilities conveys decision-relevant information to market participants. Specifically, we are 
interested in examining whether gains and losses from liabilities are value relevant. If liability 
gains and losses are not ignored by investors, we hypothesize that these gains and losses will be 
positively associated with current period stock returns if they contain decision-useful information. 
We are also interested in whether a negative association between these gains and losses and 
stock returns will materialize as critics of fair value accounting for liabilities have contended 
given the apparent misleading nature of this earnings component.  
Therefore, we test the following hypothesis (stated in null form): 
HYPOTHESIS 1. FAS 159 gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities 
are not value relevant. 
  
Next, we investigate whether investors correctly understand the valuation implications of 
these liability gains. Because firms that report fair value liability gains are essentially bad news 
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firms (i.e., they report a gain because their credit worthiness has deteriorated) and vice versa, a 
positive association between these gains and future stock returns will suggest that investors are 
initially pessimistic (optimistic) about the gains (losses) of these firms when they are first 
reported. On the other hand, a negative association between liability fair value gains and losses 
and future stock returns will suggest that investors are initially optimistic (pessimistic) about 
these gains (losses). However, subsequent price reversals occur within the next 12 months as 
investors react adversely to the deteriorating fundamentals of these firms.  
If the market is efficient and investors understand the nature of each earnings component, 
the information is incorporated into the stock price and will not have any significant association 
with future returns. However, if investors do not understand the different nature (e.g., persistence) 
of each earnings component and misreact to a specific earnings component, that earnings 
component can have a significant association with future returns. For example, Sloan (1996) 
shows that total accruals have weaker associations with future earnings than cash flow from 
operations, but investors do not understand total accruals’ implications for future earnings and 
overreact to it, leading to negative future returns (the earnings fixation hypothesis). The notion 
that fair value measurements are associated with firms’ future financial performance has been 
examined for fair value assets such as investment securities (e.g., Evans et al. 2014) and 
derivative instruments such as cash flow hedges (e.g., Campbell 2015).7 However, prior research 
has not examined whether reported fair value changes for FAS 159 designated financial 
liabilities have similar valuation implications to those for financial assets.  
                                                 
7 Specifically, Evans et al. (2014) test the predictive relation between the fair values of interest-bearing investment 
securities and future accounting income from those securities, and find that firms with larger amounts of 
accumulated unrealized gains (losses) have greater future income that outperforms (underperforms) their peers, 
whereas Campbell (2015) finds that unrealized cash flow hedge gains and losses are negatively associated with 
future changes in gross profit but negatively associated with future stock returns over the subsequent two years. 
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It is ex ante unclear whether or not investors would impute the valuation implications of 
liability gains and losses for future earnings correctly. While extant research shows that 
unrealized fair value changes reported by firms in the current period have positive valuation 
implications, as these gains and losses are eventually realized in subsequent periods by the sale 
or settlement of these financial instruments (e.g., Park et al. 1999), it is not certain whether 
reported fair value changes in liabilities are realizable or simply reversed in subsequent periods. 
Therefore, we again state our second hypothesis in the null form, as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2. FAS 159 gains and losses attributable to fair value changes in liabilities 
are not associated with future returns.  
 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample selection 
We use accounting data and filing dates (10-Q and 10-K) from Compustat, and stock 
return and price data from CRSP. We hand-collect our main variable of interest, change in fair 
value of liabilities included in earnings (ΔLIAB), after first identifying firms in the financial 
industry with nonzero change in fair value included in earnings for which the fair value option 
was elected (Compustat: TFVCEQ) and nonzero fair value liabilities (Compustat: TFVLQ), and 
then checking the 10-Q and 10-K filings of these firms to confirm that they adopted the fair 
value option for their liabilities.8 We delete observations whose beginning-of-quarter stock price 
is below $3 in order to mitigate the extreme (small-denominator) effects of low-priced stocks on 
quarterly returns. We then winsorize all the variables at the top and bottom 1 percent of the 
sample distributions. Our final sample consists of 854 firm-quarter observations from the first 
                                                 
8 Most firms that adopted the fair value option report the changes in the fair value of their designated liabilities 
either in the form of text or in table format in the 10-Q and 10-K accounting footnotes. We provide some examples 
of fair value option tables from the 10-Q (or 10-K) notes in the Appendix. 
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quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2012.9 Of these 854 firm-quarters, 397 are from banks, 210 
from financial companies, and 247 from insurance companies. We refer to this sample as the full 
sample. 
Fair value changes in financial liabilities typically arise from either changes in a firm’s 
own credit risk or overall market interest rate risk. Some firms in our sample provide quantitative 
information regarding the fair value changes in their liabilities included in earnings as a 
consequence of changes in the firm’s own credit risk.10 For these firms, we hand-collect this 
information (ΔLIAB_CREDIT) to examine its value relevance. We obtain 129 firm-quarter 
observations with fair value gains and losses from liabilities attributable to changes in the firm’s 
own credit risk. We refer to this sample as the reduced sample. 
3.2. Models for testing hypotheses  
We first analyze the valuation implications of the gains and losses from the change in fair 
value of liabilities included in earnings by estimating the following model that relates stock 
return to its various earnings components: 
QRETi,t = α0 + α1 NI_exclΔFVi,t + α2 ΔFV_ASSETi,t + α3 ΔFV_LIABi,t  
          + α4 ΔNIi,t + ei,t    (1) 
 
                                                 
9 FAS 159 was officially issued in February 2007. The standard took effect for the fiscal year beginning after 
November 15, 2007, although early adoption was permitted. On July 1, 2009, FAS 159 was codified into 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 825, Financial Instruments.  
10 The following are two examples of such disclosures: 
Citigroup Inc. 2008 Q3: “The estimated change in the fair value of these liabilities due to such changes in the 
Company's own credit risk (or instrument-specific credit risk) was a gain of $1,525 million and $112 million for the 
three months ended September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2007, respectively, and a gain of $2,576 million and 
$241 million for the nine months ended September 30, 2008 and September 30, 2007, respectively.” 
American International Group 2008 Q3:“During the three- and nine-month periods ended September 30, 2008, 
AIG recognized a loss of $184 million and a gain of $1.1 billion, respectively, attributable to the observable effect of 
changes in credit spreads on AIG’s own liabilities for which the fair value option was elected.” 
 16 
where QRETi,t is quarterly size-adjusted return measured from two trading days after the filing 
date of the 10-Q (10-K) in quarter t-1 to two trading days after the filing date of the 10-Q (10-K) 
in quarter t. We measure quarterly returns up to two trading days after the 10-Q and 10-K filing 
dates to ensure that the returns reflect investors’ responses to the information on filing dates. 
Consistent with Barth et al. (2008), we use size-adjusted returns.11 NI_exclΔFVi,t is income 
before extraordinary items per share excluding the change in fair values of assets and liabilities 
included in earnings for which the fair value option was elected. ΔFV_ASSETi,t is recognized per 
share of FAS 159 gains or losses from assets for the quarter. ΔFV_LIABi,t is recognized per share 
of FAS 159 gains or losses from liabilities for the quarter. Thus, NI_exclΔFVi,t represents income 
that excludes the effect of fair value changes in assets and liabilities. Finally, ΔNIi,t is the 
seasonal change in earnings before extraordinary items, defined as ΔNIi,t = NIi,t - NIi,t-4. We scale 
each income variable by beginning-of-quarter stock price. 
We hypothesize that the coefficient on ΔFV_LIABi,t, our main variable of interest, will be 
positive if fair value gains and losses from liabilities are value relevant. In contrast, this 
coefficient will not be reliably different from zero if fair value gains and losses from liabilities 
are not value relevant or if there are significant reliability concerns regarding their measurement. 
Consistent with the results from prior research, we expect positive coefficients on NI_exclΔFVi,t 
and ΔFV_ASSETi,t.  
Next, we use the reduced sample of firms that explicitly disclose gains and losses from 
liabilities solely due to changes in a firm’s credit risk to directly assess the value relevance of 
these liability gains and losses. Specifically, by hand-collecting fair value liability gains and 
losses per share attributable to changes in the firm’s own credit risk (ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t ), we are 
able to explicitly separate changes in the fair values of the firm’s liabilities that are due to 
                                                 
11 Using raw returns does not change our inferences in all of our analyses.  
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changes in the firm’s own credit risk from changes in fair values due to changes in other factors 
such as market interest risk. We compute the fair value change in liabilities attributable to factors 
other than changes in the firm’s own credit risk (ΔLIAB_NCREDITit) as the difference between 
ΔFV_LIABi,t and ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t. We examine the value relevance of ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t using 
the following regression model: 
QRETi,t = α0 + α1 NI_exclΔFVi,t + α2 ΔFV_ASSETi,t + α3 ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t  
          + α4 ΔLIAB_NCREDITit + α5 ΔNIi,t + ei,t  (2) 
The income variables are scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price. If fair value gains and 
losses from liabilities due to changes in the firm’s own creditworthiness are value relevant, we 
expect a positive coefficient on ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t.  
 For the test of Hypothesis 2, we replace QRETi,t  in model (1) by future one-year returns 
(RET_1YR) measured three trading days after the filing date. Thus, we estimate the following 
model: 
RET_1YRi,t  = α0 + α1 NI_exclΔFVi,t + α2 ΔFV_ASSETi,t + α3 ΔFV_LIABi,t  
                + α4 ΔNIi,t + ei,t    (3) 
 In all our regression tests, we use standard errors clustered by firm and quarter to account 
for within-firm and within-quarter correlations in residuals.   
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Univariate analyses   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. The averages of size-adjusted 
quarterly returns (QRET), one-year-ahead future size-adjusted returns (RET_1YR), income before 
extraordinary items (NI), and change in NI (ΔNI) are all negative. This is expected because our 
sample period includes the 2008 crisis period and the sample firms are in the financial industries, 
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which were affected most during the crisis period. The standard deviations of ΔFV_ASSET and 
ΔFV_LIAB (0.061 and 0.059) are about 30 percent of the standard deviation of NI, which 
indicates that fair value changes included in earnings have a significant effect on the firm’s 
earnings for our sample firms.  
 
4.2. Results of value relevance tests    
Table 2 presents the results on the value relevance of earnings components. The first 
column shows the results of the basic value relevance test with earnings (NI) and the change in 
earnings (ΔNI). The positive and statistically significant coefficients on NI (coefficient = 0.251, t 
= 2.27) and on ΔNI (coefficient = 0.083, t = 1.81) are consistent with the results of prior research. 
When we decompose NI into its respective components (NI_exclΔFV and ΔFV) in the second 
column, we find a significant positive association (0.306, t = 3.63) between QRET and 
NI_excl∆FV. We also find a significant positive relation (coefficient = 0.527; t = 2.51) between 
QRET and fair value gains and losses from assets and liabilities (∆FV). In the third column, we 
further decompose ∆FV into ∆FV_ASSET and ∆FV_LIAB and find that both ∆FV_ASSET and 
∆FV_LIAB are value relevant. Specifically, the coefficient on ∆FV_ASSET is 0.638 (t = 2.68), 
and the coefficient on ∆FV_LIAB is 0.476 (t = 3.92). The magnitude of the coefficient on 
∆FV_LIAB is smaller than that of ∆FV_ASSET. An F-test shows that the difference is significant 
at the 10 percent confidence level (p-value = 0.064).  
The results of the multivariate analyses indicate that although smaller in magnitude than 
∆FV_ASSET, ∆FV_LIAB is value relevant after controlling for other earnings components, which 
suggests that investors perceive reported FAS 159 fair value liability gains and losses as value 
relevant. In column (4), we decompose ∆FV_ASSET and ∆FV_LIAB into gains and losses 
(ΔASSET_GAIN, ΔASSET_LOSS, ΔLIAB_GAIN, and ΔLIAB_LOSS). We find that both gains and 
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losses from the fair value changes in assets are value relevant, although the coefficient for fair 
value gains appear to be larger in magnitude than the coefficient for losses (0.922, t = 2.24 vs. 
0.507, t = 2.36).  In contrast, we find significant results only for ΔLIAB_GAIN (0.455, t = 3.31) 
but not for ΔLIAB_LOSS (0.415, t = 0.87).  
 
4.3. Changes in value relevance of earnings in the post–FAS 159 period: Difference-in-
differences approach    
In this section, we investigate whether the adoption of FAS 159 improves adopters’ 
earnings value relevance compared with the value relevance of nonadopters’ earnings. This test 
sheds light on whether the FASB’s decision to promulgate FAS 159 improves the information 
content of earnings for firms that choose to adopt this standard or whether the value relevance of 
their earnings deteriorates in the postadoption period. We select control firms using four criteria: 
the log value of total assets (SIZE); the ratios of fair value assets (FV_ASSET), fair value 
liabilities (FV_LIAB), and derivatives (DERIVATIVES) to the firm’s total assets; and the firm’s 
earnings volatility (EARN VOLATILITY). Large firms are more likely to have complex financial 
products. Thus, these firms are more likely to adopt FAS 159 to reduce the burden of 
complicated hedge accounting. For the same reason, we conjecture that firms that use derivatives 
are more likely to adopt FAS 159. Another stated objective of FAS 159 is to reduce income 
volatility caused by different measurement bases for a firm’s assets and liabilities. Therefore, we 
expect that earnings volatility is a determinant of FAS 159 adoption. We also reason that firms 
that elect FAS 159 for their liabilities tend to have a higher proportion of fair value assets and 
liabilities to total assets. 
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Table 3 presents the results of the propensity score matching (PSM) criteria for selecting 
our control sample firms. We use a probit regression specification as our determinants’ model for 
whether the firm adopts FAS 159 or not (ADOPTION). As expected, Panel A of Table 3 shows 
that the coefficients for SIZE, FV_ASSET, and FV_LIAB are statistically significant and load 
positively in the correct direction. In contrast, the coefficients of DERIVATIVES and EARN 
VOLATILITY do not load significantly, although their signs are in the predicted direction. Panel 
B of Table 3 reports the univariate differences of our treatment group sample firms and control 
firms to ensure that our propensity score matching procedure properly matches our treatment 
firms and control firms such that the treatment firms are indistinguishable from the control firms 
other than the fact that the treatment firms are firms that adopt FAS 159 in their financial 
statements. As reported in Panel B, the univariate differences across the five characteristics 
suggest that our treatment and control firms are similar across our matching criteria. 
In Table 4, we report the average adjusted R2s of the value relevance regressions (QRETi,t  
= α0 + α1 NI + α2 ΔNIi,t + ei,t ) for fair value option adopters  versus nonadopters in the pre– and 
post–FAS 159 adoption periods. Following Barth et al. (2008), we randomly select, with 
replacement, the same number of firm-quarter observations and run this regression procedure a 
thousand times so as to obtain 1,000 R2s for each group. While both groups experience an 
improvement in the value relevance of their earnings from the pre–FAS 159 period to the post–
FAS 159 period, the results show that the average adjusted R2 of the value relevance regressions 
is significantly greater in the post–FAS 159 period for the adopter group than for the nonadopter 
group. The difference (0.044) is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
4.4. Association with future returns    
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To test our second hypothesis, we examine whether investors efficiently incorporate the 
information in each earnings component into the stock price. More specifically, we study the 
association between each earnings component and future one-year returns. The results show that 
the coefficient on ΔNI is significantly positive (0.158), consistent with prior literature on the 
“post earnings announcement drift” that suggests there is a delayed market reaction to the full 
implications of firms’ reported earnings. We do not find a significant association between the 
future returns and NI_exclΔFV, but we do find a significant negative coefficient for ΔFV_LIAB (-
0.922, t = -2.18), which is strong evidence that the market overreacts to this information. In the 
second column, we decompose ΔFV_LIAB into gains and losses (ΔLIAB_GAIN and 
ΔLIAB_LOSS). We find that the market’s overreaction is primarily a result of fair value liability 
gains (-1.121, t = -2.26) and not fair value losses (-0.536, t = -0.78). Contrary to the other 
earnings components that do not reverse within the next 12 months, an interpretation of these 
findings is that market participants subsequently reverse their interpretation of the information in 
these fair value gains from liabilities. A possible reason is that they realize that these gains are 
not realizable or they are more aware of the deteriorating fundamentals of these firms that lead to 
the recognition of these fair value gains in the first place.   
In the third column, we investigate whether the market overreaction to the fair value 
changes in assets and liabilities varies by the firm’s institutional ownership. Since institutional 
investors are more sophisticated than retail investors, we expect a stronger overreaction for firms 
with low institutional ownership. The results are consistent with this expectation. LOW INST 
HOLDING is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s institutional ownership is less than 
the median value, and zero otherwise. We interact LOW INST HOLDING with ΔFV_LIAB and 
ΔFV_ASSET. Our results suggest that the negative coefficient on ΔFV_LIAB in column (1) is 
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mostly driven by the firms with low institutional ownership. Specifically, we find a negative 
coefficient for the interaction variable LOW INST HOLDING × ΔFV_LIAB (significant at the 
0.10 level) and the interaction variable LOW INST HOLDING × ΔFV_ASSET (significant at the 
0.01 level). These results suggest that the market overreaction to FAS 159 gains and losses is 
more pronounced among firms with low institutional ownership.  
 
4.5. Additional analyses  
We perform several additional tests to assess the robustness of our main results. To 
address endogeneity concerns arising from self-selection issues given that not all firms elect FAS 
159 for their financial instruments, we rerun our main regressions after controlling for 
endogeneity by including the Inverse Mills ratio for the selection model that we used in Table 3.  
Table 6 reports the results of our value-relevance analyses after addressing this concern. 
We obtain similar results that are comparable with our earlier results. Specifically, column (2) of 
Table 6 shows that the fair value changes from FAS 159 adoption are positively related to 
quarterly returns (0.509, t = 2.45). When we decompose ∆FV into ∆FV_ASSET and ∆FV_LIAB, 
we continue to find that both ∆FV_ASSET and ∆FV_LIAB are value relevant. Finally, we 
decompose ∆FV_ASSET and ∆FV_LIAB into gains and losses (ΔASSET_GAIN, ΔASSET_LOSS, 
ΔLIAB_GAIN, and ΔLIAB_LOSS). Similar to our earlier results, we find that both gains and 
losses from the fair value changes in assets are value relevant. We also find a significant 
coefficient for ΔLIAB_GAIN (0.350, t = 2.98) but not for ΔLIAB_LOSS.  
In Table 7, we conduct further analyses on the fair value gains and losses due to changes 
in the firms’ own credit risk. A major debate arising from FAS 159 is whether this fair value 
component represents an economic gain or loss to the firms. The majority of firms in our sample 
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do not provide detailed footnote disclosures that allow us to isolate the fair value gains related to 
instrument-specific credit risk from other macroeconomic factors. However, a small group of 
firms in our sample does provide such disclosures.  
We hand-collect these disclosures for those firms that provide sufficient disclosures that 
enable us to decompose the fair value change in liabilities into two separate components: fair 
value changes attributable to changes in the firm’s own credit risk (ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t) and fair 
value changes attributable to factors other than changes in the firm’s own credit risk 
(ΔLIAB_NCREDITit). For firms that report fair value changes arising from changes in the firm’s 
own credit risk (ΔLIAB_CREDITi,t), we find a statistically significant coefficient (0.158) at the 
0.10 level, which suggests that the fair value changes are economically significant and value 
relevant. A caveat from this analysis is that the sample size is relatively small (131 firms); hence, 
the results may not be as statistically significant as the other results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how investors perceive fair value liability gains and losses arising 
from FAS 159 adoption. Consistent with the objectives of standard setters, we find a positive 
association between a firm’s stock returns and FAS 159 gains and losses from liabilities. We also 
find evidence that the value relevance of the earnings has improved in the post–FAS 159 
adoption period.  Our results thus suggest that the reported fair value gains and losses from 
liabilities represent value-relevant information that is priced by the market.  
We also examine whether investors understand the valuation implications of the liability 
gains and losses by investigating the association between this earnings component and future 
returns. We find that the liability gains and losses have a significant and negative association 
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with future one-year returns, indicating that investors overreact to this earnings component. In a 
cross-sectional analysis, we find that this overreaction occurs mostly in the firms with low 
institutional ownership. If retail investors fixate on net income and do not examine its various 
earnings components, these findings provide some evidence suggesting that, given the 
counterintuitive nature of such gains and losses which might be hard to comprehend, retail 
investors might have misgauged the valuation implications of these fair value liability changes.  
Our finding that there is a market correction in response to these gains also raises 
questions regarding how realizable these fair value gains truly are or whether they simply reverse 
out from the financial statements upon maturity of the related credit instruments, as critics of fair 
valuing liabilities have argued. If this is so, it would appear that the recognition of an accounting 
gain in the income statement, which eventually does not translate to greater shareholder wealth 
in the form of dividends or other distributable gains, could present a misleading assessment 
regarding a firm’s financials and cause some investors to be (incorrectly) optimistic about the 
firm’s prospects. 
Overall, our study provides empirical evidence on investors’ assessments of the impact of 
fair value gains and losses from liabilities. Our study is informative to standard setters and 
regulators regarding the importance to investors of fair value gains and losses from liabilities, 
and provides relevant information for addressing questions regarding whether firms should fair 
value their liabilities and whether fair value gains and losses from liabilities should be treated 
differently. Our study thus provides interesting evidence that contributes to the debate and 
controversy surrounding the fair value accounting for liabilities.  
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Appendix: 
Example of a fair value option table in the 10-Q and 10-K notes 
 
 
Goldman Sachs 2010 1Q note 
 
 
The Fair Value Option Gains (Losses) 
 
The following table sets forth the gains (losses) included in earnings for the three months ended 
March 2010 and March 2009 as a result of the firm electing to apply the fair value option to certain 
financial assets and financial liabilities, as described in Note 2. 
 
  Three Months 
 Ended March 
 2010  2009 
 (in millions) 
Unsecured long-term borrowings  $ 84  $ (135)
Other secured financings (4)   25
Unsecured short-term borrowings 13   (67)
Receivables from customers and counterparties (38)   (2)
Other liabilities and accrued expenses  69   82
Other  (3)   (26)
       
Total  $ 121  $ (123)
          
 
The effect of the firm’s own credit spread on income 
 
The following table sets forth the net gains (losses) attributable to the impact of changes in the firm’s own 
credit spreads on borrowings for which the fair value option was elected. 
 
  
Three Months  
Ended March 
  2010        2009 
  (in millions) 
Net gains (losses) including hedges $ 107 $ (197)
Net gains (losses) excluding hedges  109   (192)
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics of full sample for value relevance analysis 
 
Table 1 presents the full sample descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
 
 
Mean Median Std Dev Min 5% Lower Quartile 
Upper  
Quartile 95% Max 
          
NI -0.027 0.015 0.182 -1.191 -0.305 -0.013 0.029 0.084 0.361 
ΔFV 0.005 0.000 0.075 -0.366 -0.054 -0.002 0.005 0.080 0.444 
NI_exclΔFV -0.028 0.014 0.178 -1.183 -0.286 -0.017 0.029 0.076 0.383 
ΔFV_ASSET -0.001 0.000 0.061 -0.366 -0.057 -0.001 0.002 0.052 0.291 
ΔFV_LIAB 0.006 0.000 0.059 -0.144 -0.026 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.450 
ΔNI -0.009 -0.001 0.208 -0.947 -0.283 -0.036 0.018 0.282 0.931 
QRET -0.023 -0.034 0.247 -0.645 -0.453 -0.132 0.073 0.389 1.026 
RET_1YR -0.027 0.015 0.182 -1.191 -0.305 -0.013 0.029 0.084 0.361 
          
 
NI =   income before extraordinary items per share for quarter t, scaled by the 
beginning-of-quarter stock price 
ΔFV = the change in fair values of assets and liabilities included in earnings for which 
the fair value option was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price 
 
NI_exclΔFV =   NI - ΔFV  
 
ΔFV_ASSET = change in fair value of assets per share included in earnings for which the fair 
value option was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price 
ΔFV_LIAB =   change in fair value of liabilities per share included in earnings for which the 
fair value option was elected, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock price 
ΔNI = NI for quarter t minus NI for quarter t-4, scaled by beginning-of-quarter stock 
price 
QRET =   quarterly size-adjusted return measured from two trading days after the filing 
date of quarter t-1 up to two trading days after the filing date of quarter t 
RET_1YR = One-year buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns measured from three trading days 
after the filing date of quarter t  
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TABLE 2 
Value relevance tests 
 
Table 2 presents the results of regression analyses examining the value relevance of the earnings components. The 
dependent variable is quarterly size-adjusted return (QRET). ΔASSET_GAIN is ΔFV_ASSET if ΔFV_ASSET is 
positive, and zero otherwise. ΔASSET_LOSS is ΔFV_ASSET if ΔFV_ASSET is negative, and zero otherwise. 
ΔLIAB_GAIN is ΔFV_LIAB if ΔFV_LIAB is positive, and zero otherwise. ΔLIAB_LOSS is ΔFV_LIAB if ΔFV_LIAB 
is negative, and zero otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Table 1. Industry fixed effects is included in 
each regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to account for within-firm and within-quarter 
correlations in residuals. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: QRET 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
NI 0.251** 
(2.27) 
ΔNI 0.083* 0.062 0.062 0.052
(1.81) (1.60) (1.40) (1.10) 
NI_exclΔFV 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.307*** 
(3.63) (3.21) (3.42) 
ΔFV 0.527** 
(2.51) 
ΔFV_ASSET 0.683*** 
(2.68)
ΔFV_LIAB 0.476*** 
(3.92) 
ΔASSET_GAIN 0.922** 
(2.24) 
ΔASSET_LOSS 0.507** 
(2.36) 
ΔLIAB_GAIN    0.455*** 
    (3.31) 
ΔLIAB_LOSS    0.415 
    (0.87) 
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
(0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (-0.45) 
     
Observations 854 854 854 854 
Adj. R2 0.052 0.065 0.065 0.065 
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TABLE 3 
Treatment and control firm selection for difference-in-difference test 
 
Propensity score matching procedure (PSM) is used to select the control firms for the difference-in-difference test of 
the earnings value relevance. We first select treatment firms that report the gains and losses from the fair value 
change in liabilities (hereafter, liability gains). Then, we collect other financial firms that have nonzero fair value 
assets and nonzero fair value liabilities but did not report the liability gains in our sample period from Compustat. 
Finally, we run a probit regression of ADOPTION (an indicator variable of one if a firm belongs to the treatment 
group, and zero otherwise) on the following firm characteristics: the log value of total assets (SIZE), the ratios of fair 
value assets (FV_ASSET), fair value liabilities (FV_LIAB), and derivatives (DERIVATIVES) to the firm’s total assets, 
and earnings volatilities (EARN VOLATILITY). EARN VOLATILITY is measured in the preadoption period. The 
other variables are measured in the first quarter of the adoption period. After this PSM, we obtain 44 treatment and 
44 control firms. Panel A shows the results of the first-stage selection model used for the PSM. Industry fixed effect 
is included in the selection model. Panel B shows the mean differences in firm characteristics between the final 
treatment and control groups chosen by the PSM and the t-statistics.   
 
Panel A: Selection model 
 
    
Dependent variable: ADOPTION 
    
SIZE  0.272*** 
(6.65) 
FV_ASSET 0.692* 
(1.70) 
FV_LIAB 1.412** 
(2.19) 
DERIVATIVES 17.403 
(0.56) 
EARN VOLATILITY 0.866 
(0.16) 
Constant -3.947*** 
(-10.80) 
Observations 825 
Pseudo R2 0.210 
  
 
 
Panel B: Differences in firm characteristics    
 
 Treatment group  Control group Difference t-statistics 
SIZE  9.693 9.484 0.209 0.43 
FV_ASSET 0.343 0.360 -0.017 -0.32 
FV_LIAB 0.113 0.066 -0.047 -1.09 
DERIVATIVES 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.79 
EARN VOLATILITY 0.006 0.007 -0.001 -0.17 
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TABLE 4 
Difference-in-difference value relevance test 
 
Table 4 presents the difference-in-difference test results of earnings value relevance. Following Barth, Landsman, 
and Lang (2008), we randomly select, with replacement, the same number of firm-quarter observations, and run the 
value relevance regression of return on earnings and the change in earnings (QRETi,t  = α0 + α1 NIi,t + α2 ΔNIi,t + ei,t). 
We repeat this procedure 1,000 times, and obtain 1,000 R2s for each group (Pre- vs. postadoption period and 
treatment vs. control groups). We report the averages, and standard deviation of the R2s, and the differences, and t-
values of the differences. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.   
 
 
  Treatment group  Control group Difference 
  Mean  Std dev Mean  Std dev (t-statistics) 
Pre–FAS 159 0.045 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.003*** 
          (3.48) 
Post–FAS 159 0.088 0.037 0.044 0.042 0.044*** 
          (28.85) 
Difference 0.043***   0.002*     
(t-value) (31.00)   (1.86)     
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TABLE 5 
One-year-ahead return tests 
 
Table 5 presents the results of regression analyses examining the association between the future one-year size-
adjusted returns (RET_1YR) and the earnings components. LOW INST HOLDING is an indicator variable of one if a 
firm’s institutional ownership is less than the median value and zero otherwise.  All the other variables are defined 
in Tables 1 and 2. Industry fixed effects is included in each regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
quarter to account for within-firm and within-quarter correlations in residuals.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: RET_1YR 
    
(1) (2) (3) 
        
ΔNI 0.158*** 0.137*** 0.188*** 
(3.24) (3.34) (2.92) 
NI_exclΔFV 0.017 0.048 0.021 
(0.12) (0.37) (0.16) 
ΔFV_ASSET -0.573 0.538 
(-1.62) (1.24) 
ΔFV_LIAB -0.922** 0.792 
(-2.18) (1.64) 
ΔASSET_GAIN -0.075  
(-0.15)  
ΔASSET_LOSS -0.970  
(-1.58)  
ΔLIAB_GAIN -1.121**  
(-2.26)  
ΔLIAB_LOSS -0.536  
(-0.78)  
LOW INST HOLDING   -0.034 
   (-0.86) 
LOW INST HOLDING × ΔFV_ASSET   -2.207*** 
   (-3.53) 
LOW INST HOLDING × ΔFV_LIAB   -1.555* 
   (-1.68) 
Constant -0.111*** -0.117*** -0.096** 
(-2.84) (-2.86) (-2.37) 
    
Observations 851 851 851 
Adj. R2 0.043 0.043 0.054 
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TABLE 6 
Value relevance tests after controlling for endogeneity 
 
Table 6 presents the results of regression analyses examining the value relevance of the earnings components after 
controlling for endogeneity. Using the same selection model used in Table 3, we compute the Inverse Mills ratio and 
include it in each regression. All the variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. Industry fixed effects is included in 
each regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter to account for within-firm and within-quarter 
correlations in residuals. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: QRET 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
NI 0.252** 
(2.31) 
ΔNI 0.062 0.047 0.047 0.032 
(1.36) (1.22) (1.04) (0.68) 
NI_exclΔFV 0.298*** 0.281*** 0.300*** 
(3.44) (3.01) (3.25) 
ΔFV 0.509** 
(2.45) 
ΔFV_ASSET 0.674*** 
(2.62) 
ΔFV_LIAB 0.432*** 
(4.86) 
ΔASSET_GAIN 0.998** 
(2.51) 
ΔASSET_LOSS 0.424** 
(2.23) 
ΔLIAB_GAIN    0.350*** 
    (2.98) 
ΔLIAB_LOSS    0.604 
    (1.34) 
Inverse Mills 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
(0.75) (0.93) (0.78) (1.54) 
     
Constant -0.025 -0.031 -0.028 -0.034 
 (-1.08) (-1.27) (-1.19) (-1.35) 
     
Observations 840 840 840 840 
Adj. R2 0.047 0.058 0.058 0.059 
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TABLE 7 
Analysis on fair value gains and losses due to changes in firms’ own credit risk  
 
Table 7 presents the results of regression analyses examining the value relevance of the earnings components of the 
firms with the fair value gains and losses due to changes in firms’ own credit risks and firms without them. The 
dependent variable is quarterly size-adjusted return (QRET). ΔLIAB_CREDIT is the fair value gains and losses due 
to changes in firms’ own credit risks. ΔLIAB_NCREDIT is ΔFV_LIAB - ΔLIAB_CREDIT.  All the other variables are 
defined in Table 1. Industry fixed effects is included in each regression. Standard errors are clustered by firm and 
quarter to account for within-firm and within-quarter correlations in residuals. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: QRET 
   
Variable 
Firms with ΔLIAB_CREDIT 
(1) 
Firms without ΔLIAB_CREDIT 
(2) 
      
ΔNI -0.021 0.116 
(-0.28) (1.30) 
NI_exclΔFV 0.368*** 0.221** 
(3.88) (2.02) 
ΔFV_ASSET 0.588** 0.657* 
(2.27) (1.70) 
ΔLIAB_CREDIT 0.158* 
(1.96) 
ΔLIAB_NCREDIT 0.315 
(0.82) 
ΔFV_LIAB 0.450*** 
(7.33) 
Constant -0.051*** -0.027 
(-3.43) (-1.52) 
Observations 131 723 
Adj. R2 0.142 0.050 
   
 
 
 
 
